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I.

INTRODUCTION

Law schools are preparing students for a world of litigation that no
longer exists. Gone are the days of frequent jury trials and appellate
arguments. Yet, law schools persist in teaching these advocacy skills and
largely ignore instruction on persuading district court judges.
Litigation involves persuasion, through written or oral advocacy,
and sometimes, depending on the decision-maker, both. Law schools
provide opportunities for students to learn the art of legal persuasion through
trial and appellate advocacy classes. Trial advocacy programs are focused
on teaching students the skills of presenting evidence to and persuading
juries.' Appellate advocacy programs are focused on teaching students the
skills of appellate brief writing and persuading a panel of judges in a timed
and structured oral argument setting. Jury trial advocacy and appellate
advocacy courses were created at a time when juries decided a large
percentage of cases, and appellate courts entertained arguments in a high
percentage of cases.3
Since then, jury trials have largely disappeared, and appellate oral
arguments are disappearing. The number of jury trials occurring in practice
has plummeted, as have the number of appellate oral arguments.' At the
same time, the number of pretrial motions has increased significantly.' Thus,
the focus of litigation has shifted to the pretrial stage. Nevertheless, law
schools keep producing graduates who can try jury trials and conduct
appellate arguments, but fewer graduates emerge from law school having6
learned anything about motion practice or arguing to district judges.
Missing from law school curriculum are courses focused on teaching
students how to persuade judges at the district level, whether it be in a bench
trial or in hearings- a skill I will call judicial advocacy .7 It is time that we

2 It is for this reason that I will refer to trial advocacy programs as jury trial advocacy programs.
3 See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
6 See Peter Toll Hoffman, Law Schools and the Changing Face of Practice,56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 203, 205-06 (2012) (noting that young lawyers are most likely to appear before and argue
motions to district court judges, rather than handle jury trials).
7 Indeed, there is not even a term commonly used to refer to this type of advocacy. It is not
trial advocacy, except when it is a bench trial, but it certainly is not appellate advocacy. In another
article, the Honorable Leonard T. Strand and I have coined the term "judicial advocacy" to refer to
this form of advocacy. See CJ. Williams & Leonard T. Strand, Judicial Advocacy: How to
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shift the focus of legal advocacy education from the historic emphasis on
jury trials and appellate court oral arguments to incorporate and emphasize
instruction on judicial advocacy.' As Bob Dylan famously predicted they
would, the times have changed and the legal curriculum needs to change with
the times. 9

It is also important to understand that the skills learned in jury trial
and appellate advocacy courses are not all transferrable to the trial court
setting.' 0 Some of those skills can be ineffective with district judges, and
others may actually be counterproductive." The context of advocacy to

Advocate to a Judge (pending publication in the American Journal of Trial Advocacy 2020). Thus,
I will use that term in the same fashion in this Article.
8 I hesitate to label judges at the district court level, like myself, as "trial judges" when, in fact,
we preside over a decreasing number of trials each year. It is akin to the change in terminology
adopted by many attorneys by moving away from calling themselves "trial attorneys," and instead
using the broader term "litigators." See Mark W. Bennett, Essay: The GrandPoobah and Gorillas
in Our Midst: Enhancing Civil Justice in the FederalCourts-Swapping Discovery Proceduresin
the FederalRules of Civil and Criminal Proceduresand Other Reforms Like Trial by Agreement,
15 NEV. LJ. 1293, 1308-10 (2015) (emphasizing how "vanishing" trials caused attorneys to no
longer refer to themselves as trial attorneys); see also Robert P. Bums, Advocacy in the Era of the
Vanishing Trial, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 893, 893-94 (2013) ("It has often been remarked ruefully that
'trial lawyers' have almost all become 'litigators."'). Hence, I have chosen to refer in this Article
to judges below the appellate level as simply "judges" or "district judges," and include within the
definition of this term all judicial officers below the appellate court level who decide matters,
whether they are motions or bench trials, on their own and not as a member of a judicial panel with
other judges.
9 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 205, 208 (explaining change in practice of law and arguing
that "law schools continue to be a 'step behind' in preparing students for the practice of law," and
concluding that "today's students are being readied for yesterday's legal practice"); see also John
K. Larkins, Jr., Oral Argument on Motions, 23 No. 2 LMG. 16, 16 (1997) (suggesting that arguing
motions before judges "is far and away the most common form of oral advocacy, and often the
most important."). Nonetheless, motion practice has received the least amount of systematic
thought or study. See Larkins, supra note 9, at 16. Jury advocacy and appellate advocacy gamer
the glamor of law school courses. Id. "Oral argument before a trial court and without a jury, which
occurs much more frequently than jury or appellate arguments (even in these days of law clerks
and briefs), is the blue-collar, day-in-day-out thing lawyers do routinely-and sometimes not very
well." Id.
10 Cheerleaders for moot court programs tend to believe that skills learned there prepares
students to argue in any court. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Judging: The Missing Piece of the Moot
CourtPuzzle, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 45,47 (2006) ("Moot court give students a taste of real appellate
work while teaching skills that will help both in law school and in all areas of practice."); see also
John T. Gaubatz, Moot Court in the Modern Law School, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 87, 87 (1981) ("The
[appellate advocacy] experience has the corollary benefit of preparing counsel for the task of
making legal arguments before any court, and in general strengthens persuasive skills."). Although
I believe appellate advocacy courses are very valuable, I disagree, for the reasons explained in this
Article, that the skills learned in appellate advocacy courses equip students effectively to argue
before any court.
" See infra Part IV.
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.12
district judges is different than that needed for juries and appellate courts
District judges also hear and decide cases differently than jurors and juries
and to some degree differently than appellate judges. 3
Law schools need a new approach to teaching advocacy. Law
schools need an approach that: (1) recognizes that there are differences in
effective advocacy to judges, juries, and appellate courts; (2) identifies ways
to make attorneys more effective with each decision-maker; and (3) develops
advocacy programs that teach students how to be effective advocates in all
three settings.
In this Article, I first review the history of advocacy programs in law
schools .14 Next, I place the development of those programs in the context of
the changing nature of litigation practice from the time these programs were
developed to today.II The penultimate section of the Article summarizes just
some of the ways in which effective advocacy differs between judges, juries,
and appellate courts. 6 In conclusion, I propose the development of a single,
more integrated legal advocacy program that incorporates advocacy to
judges, juries, and appellate courts, in that order.' 7

11.

HISTORY OF LAW SCHOOL ADVOCACY ACADEMICS

Law schools educate students about effective advocacy in two
litigation settings: jury trials; and appeals. The focus on teaching students
how to advocate to juries and appellate courts is the product of two
developments in the history of legal education. Appellate advocacy training
developed first as a result of the focus of modem legal education on appellate
cases. 8 A jury trial advocacy organization, on the other hand, spearheaded
the start of jury trial advocacy programs. 19
A. Development of Appellate Advocacy Programs
The modem law school education's use of the case method has been
the dominant form of American legal education since Professor Christopher
Columbus Langdell introduced the practice at Harvard Law School in
12

See infra Section W.A.

13 See infra Section IV.B.
14

See infra Part II.

15 See infra Part II
16 See infra Part IV.

See infra Part V.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 20-29.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
'7
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1870.20 This method focuses on the examination of appellate court decisions

as a means of understanding the purpose, development, and meaning of the
law. 21 It is a scientific approach to the law divorced from a skills-based
22
approach.
Moot court programs began in American law schools in the early
1800s. Harvard Law School started its moot court program in 1820, and the
University of Virginia School of Law followed in the mid-1840s .23 Moot
court complemented and really became an extension of the case method of
teaching in law school because both methods focused on appellate courts and
opinions.4 Moot court programs can also accurately be described as
appellate advocacy programs because they invariably are set in a mock

appellate court.2 That means, of course, that the focus is on legal arguments,
and not factual disputes, which are almost always the actual focus of a district
court's ruling. 26 Today, most, if not all, law schools have moot court

programs as part of their curriculum.2 7 These moot court programs, and the
national and international competitions that have arisen from them, involve
students writing appellate briefs and making oral arguments in a mock

See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 209 (highlighting history and development of case method of
legal education).
21 See John T. Gaubatz, Of Moots, Legal Process,and Learningto Learn the Law, 37 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 473, 481-82 (1983) (highlighting development of case method of legal education).
22 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 209 ("But Langdell's new teaching method came with a
price-its 'scientific' approach to the law and its exclusive focus on appellate court decisions
caused legal education to become divorced of nearly all skills training except legal analysis,
research, and writing.").
23 See LARRY L. TEPLY, LAW SCHOOL COMPETITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 19 (2003)
(acknowledging moot court started at Harvard Law School and "spread quickly to other law
schools"); see also Darby Dickerson, In re Moot Court, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1217, 1223 (2000)
(citing First-YearAmes Moot Court, HARV. L. SCHOOL, https://orgs.law.harvard.edu/bsa/ll-ames/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2020), and JOHN RrrCHrE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA FOR THE PERIOD 1826-1926 34 (1978)) (recounting history of
moot court programs as component of legal education).
24 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 209 (noting that appellate advocacy programs were largely
an extension of writing aspect of case method); see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 229 n.88 (1983) (stating that by 1948
nearly all law schools had appellate moot court programs).
25 See Eric E. Bergsten, ExperientialEducation Through the Vis Moot, 34 J. L. & COM. 1, 4
(2015) (explaining how "moot court" most typically refers to appellate, and not trial, advocacy).
26 See id. ("The typical moot court is set in an appellate court, which means that only legal
issues are available for argument, not the factual issues that probably dominated the case in the trial
court.").
27 See Kritchevsky, supra note 10, at 45-46 (emphasizing that "virtually every law
school has
a moot court board that runs in-school competitions"); see also Gaubatz, supra note 10, at 87
(stating that in 1981, "most [law] schools have some moot court in their research and writing
program").
20
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appellate court. 28 It is sometimes the only required law school component
21
that teaches students anything about oral advocacy.
B. Development of Jury Trial Advocacy Programs
Although they are a half-century old now, jury trial advocacy
courses are a more recent development. The first jury trial advocacy courses
3°
were offered in law schools in the 1970s. Jury trial advocacy courses were
the direct result of the founding of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy
(NITA) in 1971.31 NITA offered its first jury trial advocacy course in the
summer of 1972.32 Soon thereafter, law schools began somewhat reluctantly
offering jury trial advocacy classes."3 Nevertheless, the NITA methodology,
which focused on jury trial advocacy, eventually became the model upon
34
Today,
which all law school jury trial advocacy programs were based.

28 See Gaubatz, supra note 10, at 89-90 (describing moot court program generally); see also

Dickerson, supra note 23, at 1219-22 (detailing process of joining moot court team and what being
on team entails).
29 See Richard E. Finneran, Wherefore Moot Court, 53 WASH. U. J.L & POL'Y 121, 125 (2017)
("For most law students, moot court serves as their singular introduction to the art of appellate
advocacy during their time in law school. For some, it may be their sole orientation to oral advocacy
altogether."); see also Jennifer Kruse Hanrahan, Truth in Action: Revitalizing ClassicalRhetoric
as a Tool for Teaching Oral Advocacy in American Law Schools, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & LJ.299,
305-06 (2003) (summarizing course offerings at major American law schools).
30 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 210 (discussing history of development of jury trial advocacy
programs in law schools); see also Edward D. Ohlbaum, Basic Instinct: Case Theory and
Courtroom Performance,66 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) ("Until the last quarter century, law schools
did not [train students in jury trial advocacy.]"); James W. McElhaney, Toward the Effective
Teaching of TrialAdvocacy, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 198, 198 (1975) (stating that only since 1970s
have law schools offered jury trial advocacy courses). There were, to be sure, earlier versions of
skills-based courses offered in the mid-century, but they largely focused on legal analysis and the
drafting of legal documents related to trial practice and bore little resemblance to the modem jury
trial advocacy course. See STEVENS, supra note 24, at 214-15, 227 n.77-78 (describing training
only tangentially mentioning "argumentative advocacy," and instead focusing on draftsmanship,
research, and writing); see also Hoffman, supra note 6, at 210 (noting that mid-century skills-based
training "bore scant resemblance to the trial advocacy courses of today").
31 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 210 ("lt was only with the founding of the National Institute
for Trial Advocacy (NITA), in 1971, that things began to change and trial advocacy became an
established part of the law school curriculum.").
32 See Terence F. MacCarthy, The History of the Teaching of Trial Advocacy, 38 STETSON L.
REV. 115, 117 (2008) (discussing history of trial advocacy law classes).
33 See id. at 123 (noting reluctance of law schools to embrace skills-based curriculum in
academic setting).
34 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 211 (explaining how NITA methodology regarding trial
advocacy was rapidly adopted by law schools).
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"every law school in the country offers a course focused on building trial
advocacy skills.""

C. Advocacy Courses in Law Schools
Law schools generally require first-year students to take an appellate
advocacy class, which involves writing an appellate brief and making a
corresponding oral argument.3 6 The course is intended to provide basic
research, writing, and oral advocacy skills thought to be of aid to every law
student, even if a student later chose not to enter the litigation field. Trial
advocacy and advanced appellate advocacy courses, which feed into
competitions, are elective upper-level courses. The courses are not
interconnected, meaning the factual record and legal issues in the trial and
appellate advocacy courses are not the same. In other words, the appellate
advocacy course does not involve an appeal of the case problem that was the
subject of the trial advocacy course.
In recent decades, law schools have made some pedagogical changes
in response to the increasing use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
instead of trials, to resolve legal disputes. Scores of law schools offer classes
on mediation or other forms of ADR, and law school ADR competitions have
emerged as well.7 NITA has also broadened its publication offerings in
35 id.
36 See Dickerson, supra note 23, at 1218 ("Moot court-or appellate advocacy-skills are
typically taught as part of the first-year research and writing curriculum and are sharpened in some
upperlevel [sic] electives."); see also Gaubatz, supra note 10, at 90 (explaining that moot court
programs are normally "an integral part of the first-year program").
37 See Laurie A. Lewis, Law Student Mediators Wear a Triple Crown: Skilled, Sellable, and
Successful, 50 U.S.F. L. REv. 165, 168 n.9 (2016) ("Approximately 185 U.S. law schools offer
courses in ADR, twenty-three of which self-report as having ADR class requirements."); Cynthia
A. Savage, Recommendations Regarding the Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 11 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 512 (2010) (reporting number of mediation clinics in Canadian and
American law schools); see also Joseph B. Stulberg, Donald C. Peter, Tracy L. Allen & Judith P.
Myers, Creatingand Certifying the Professional Mediator-Educationand Credentialing,28 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 75, 78 (2004).

[Noting that a 2003 survey showed] 79, almost half of the 184 ABA approved law
schools, offer a course focused on mediation ....Eighty-seven schools offer a course in
negotiation. Nine schools now are offering a specific course in dispute resolution
advocacy, which presumably includes mediation advocacy. One hundred forty-one
schools offer a dispute resolution survey course, which presumably covers negotiation
but may or may not cover mediation.
Peter, supra note 37, at 78. See Robert Rubinson, Of Grids and Gatekeepers:The Socioeconomics
of Mediation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 873, 904 (2016) (noting "American Bar
Association sponsors a 'Representation in Mediation Competition' for law students"); see also
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response to an increase in ADR use to include numerous volumes on
38
mediation, arbitration, and litigation before administrative agencies.
Missing from the advocacy curriculum in law schools today are
courses focused on teaching students the skills they are most likely to
exercise in practice, such as persuading a judicial officer occupying the role
of decision-maker. This is a skill of increasing importance. As explained in
Part III of this Article, litigation has evolved in America, resulting in a
decrease in the number of jury trials and appellate oral arguments, and
leading to an increase in motions practice.
III. THE EVOLVING TREND OF LITIGATION IN AMERICA
"For the first one hundred years following the invention of the
modem American law school in 1870, trials were common occurrences and
were generally accepted as a primary method of resolving legal disputes in
this country. ' ' 39 No longer is this the case. Much has been written already
about vanishing jury trialsI and at least some has been written, in passing,
about vanishing appellate oral arguments." This Article does not intend to
Douglas Pilawa, Sifting Through the Arbitratorsfor the Woman, the Minority, the Newcomer, 51
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 395, 401 (2019) (describing Willem C. Vis International Commercial
Arbitration Moot competition as "an international arbitration competition with thousands of law
school participants").
38 See NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOC., https://www.nita.org/publications/books-dvds (last
visited Mar. 24, 2020) (listing NITA's book titles and descriptions). NITA offers courses on many
topics, but none for motions practice appear on its 2020 calendar of courses. See id. (courses
dropdown tab provides access to online courses as well as courses in twenty states).
'9 Hoffman, supra note 6, at 205.
40 See e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examinationof Trialsand RelatedMatters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 459, 460 (2004) ("In some, perhaps
most, forums, the absolute number of trials has undergone a sharp decline."); John H. Langbein,
The Disappearanceof Civil Trial in the UnitedStates, 122 YALE LJ.522,524? (2012) (discussing
drastic decline in number of civil cases concluding at trial); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The
Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131,2135 (2018) (discussing drastic decline in number
of civil trials at state and federal levels); Graham K. Bryant & Kristopher R. McClellan, The
DisappearingCivil Trial: Implicationsfor the Future of Law Practice,30 REGENT U. L. REV. 287,
287 (2018) (addressing "the widespread disappearance of traditional civil trials from state and
federal courts across America"); Robert J. Conrad, Jr., & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing
Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 103
(2018) (noting from 2006 to 2016 that jury trial criminal cases declined forty-seven percent);
Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortionand the End of Innocence in FederalCriminalJustice, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 79, 90-91, fig.1 (2005) (showing in 2002 that federal criminal trials occurred in 4.8%
of cases).
41 See Galanter, supra note 41, at 529 ("Although the number of appeals has increased, the
number subject to intensive full-dress review has declined. More appeals are decided on the basis
of briefs alone, without oral argument."); see also Nancy Winkleman, Just a Brief Writer?, 29
LITIG.50,51 (2003) (highlighting in 2002 how two-thirds of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases decided
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add new data or insight into the causes for the marked decline. Rather, the
point here is to take a more careful look at that data in relation to when law
schools began providing trial and appellate advocacy classes. Here, I will
summarize the findings regarding significant decreases in jury trials and
appellate oral arguments, increases in motions practice, and then contrast the
timeline of these events with the timeline of law schools offering jury trial
advocacy and appellate advocacy courses.
A.

Vanishing Jury Trials

In the 1930s, a fifth of all civil cases filed in federal courts were
resolved at trial.42 In a very real sense, "[c]ivil practice was still [then] in
significant measure a trial practice. 43 In 1962, 11.5 percent of civil cases
proceeded to trial.' In 1972-around the time law schools started offering
jury trial advocacy courses 45 - about nine percent of federal civil cases went
to trial.46 By 2002, the number of federal civil cases proceeding to trial
dropped to 1.8 percent.4 7 By 2016, a mere one percent of federal civil cases
were resolved at trial.48 Two years later, that number slipped below one
percent. 49 The number of civil cases proceeding to trial in state court, where

without oral argument); Nancy S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom,44 ARIZ.
STATE L. J. 1489, 1544-45 (2012) (showing trend among federal circuit courts of appeal toward
holding fewer oral arguments); Finneran, supra note 29, at 121 ("Appellate argument is in
decline.").
42 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 524 (citing Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil
Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 183, 185 n.9 (2001), in turn citing Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequencesof Modern Civil Process, 1994 WiS. L. REV. 631,633 n.3 (1994), in
turn citing a 1938 report by the Attorney General)); see also Galanter, supra note 40, at 464
(explaining 18.9% of civil cases were terminated by trial in 1938).
43 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 524; see also Bryant, supra note 40, at 295 (noting civil
trials made up 19.9% of all case dispositions in 1938).
44 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 461 (examining disproportionate increase in total
dispositions compared to decrease in trial dispositions).
45 See MacCarthy, supra note 32, at 123 (relating history of trial advocacy courses in law
schools).
46 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 524 (denoting consistent decline in cases tried over
decades).
47 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 461.
48 See Bryant, supra note 40, at 295.
49 See Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2018, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (U.S.
COURTS),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-unitedstates-courts (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). There is reason to believe that even these numbers
overstate the percentage of federal cases that actually go to "trial" in the common understanding of
that term (when either a judge or a jury renders a verdict after presentation of evidence). That is
because what the Administrative Office of the United States Courts counts as "trials" include "all
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most cases are filed," has also dropped precipitously. Between 1976 and
2002, the percentage of state civil cases proceeding to jury trial dropped from
1.8 percent to .06 percent, and the number of civil cases proceeding to bench
trials dropped from 34.3 percent to 15.2 percent.5 From 1992 to 2002, there
was an even more pronounced forty-four percent drop of the number of state
civil cases proceeding to jury trial, and bench trials dropped twenty-one
52
percent .
The number of criminal cases proceeding to jury trial has also
dropped precipitously. In 1962-again shortly before law schools began
teaching jury trial advocacy -approximately fifteen percent of federal
criminal cases went to trial.5 3 By 2002, that number dropped to under five
percent.5 4 By 2018, the number of defendants tried by a jury fell to two
percent. 5 The drop was similar in state criminal cases in 2002, going from
6
8.5 percent proceeding to trial in 1976 to 3.3 percent proceeding to trial . In
were
short, "we have gone from a world in which trials, typically jury trials,
57
rare.'
'vanishingly
become
have
trials
which
in
routine, to a world

contested proceeding[s] at which evidence is introduced." See Engstrom, supra note 40, at 2139
(internal quotations omitted).
50 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 506 ("The great preponderance of trials, both civil and
criminal, take place in the state courts.").
51 See id.at 506-07; see also Bryant, supra note 40, at 297-98 (noting civil bench and jury
trials declined from 36% in 1976 to under 16% in 2002). It is important to note that from 1976 to
2002, far more state cases were resolved by bench trial than by jury trial. See Bryant, supra note
40, at 298 (observing that the number of civil jury trials "never approach[ ] the number of civil
bench trials."). Yet law schools have focused on teaching students how to try jury trials instead of
bench trials. See John N. Sharifi, Approaching the Bench: Trial Techniquesfor Defense Counsel
inCriminal Bench Trials, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 687, 687 (2005) (observing that "training in
trial advocacy almost universally focuses only on the jury trial. Rarely, if ever, are trial advocacy
techniques taught in the context of bench trials."). A glance at texts on trial advocacy reveal the
same focus on jury trials. See generally STEVEN LUBERT & J.C. LORE, MODERN TRIAL
ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS & PRACTICE (5th ed. 2015); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES AND
TRIALS (10th ed. 2017). The National Institute for Trial Advocacy text, Modern Trial Advocacy,
only references bench trials in passing in three places. Professor Thomas A. Mauet's Trial
Techniques addresses the topic in a final chapter, which is nineteen pages in a 619-page text.
52 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 508 (noting "an even more pronounced 44 percent drop in
the absolute number of jury trials" from 1992 to 2002).
" See id. at 493.
54 See id.
55 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 49 (showing how another .3 percent were tried in a bench
trial).
56 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 510.
57 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 524. It is also interesting-and relevant to the importance
of training law students about judicial advocacy as opposed to jury trial advocacy-that the few
trials occurring each year are also getting shorter. See generally Engstrom, supra note 40, at 2133
("[T]rials are not only vanishing. The few that remain also appear to be shrinking ... trials seem to
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B. Increasingly Rare Appellate OralArguments
The number of cases proceeding to appeal and oral argument has
also declined significantly in the last century. With the decline in cases going
to trial, there is a corresponding decline in the number of cases appealed
because many cases were resolved by settlement or guilty plea 8 More
importantly, fewer appeals result in oral arguments. Between 1997 and
2007, federal appeals courts went from hearing oral arguments in forty
percent of all cases to twenty-seven percent on average- a stark thirty-three
percent decline .9 The latest data from the U.S. Courts for the fiscal year
ending September 2018 shows that oral arguments were granted in only
slightly more than twenty percent of all appeals terminated on the merits .60
C. Increase in Motion Practice
In contrast to the sharp decline in jury trials and appellate oral
arguments, the number of motions heard and decided by district court judges
has increased.61 In civil cases, district court judges can enter orders that are
dispositive as to all or some of a party's claims in ruling on motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 62 In federal courts, the
development of civil discovery, combined with the adoption of the summary
judgment rule (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56) in 1937 and the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of Rule 56 in a trilogy of cases in 1986,63 has
be undergoing a subtle metamorphosis: becoming shorter, more regimented, subject to less party
control, and more affected by particular judicial whims.").
58 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 505 (noting federal cases are appealed four times more than
cases terminated without trials, "[a]nd as the proportion of tried cases falls, the portion of concluded
appeals that are from trials falls and so does the absolute number of appellate decisions in tried
cases"); see also Bryant, supra note 40, at 314 (discussing "[t]he most obvious-and most
important-consequence of fewer civil trials on appellate courts is that there are fewer appeals.").
59 See Marder, supra note 41, at 1545; see also Thomas E. Baker, IntramuralReforms: How
the U.S. Courts of Appeal Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913,916 (1995) (noting
in 1995 "between 40% and 50% of the appeals decided on the merits by [federal] courts of appeals
in recent years are being decided without oral argument.").
60 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 49.
61 See Engstrom, supra note 40, at 2136 (explaining that "... over the years, we have seen an
uptick in pretrial motions practice (both motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment).").
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
63 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986) (ruling Rule 56 did not require
party to support motion with affidavits or similar materials); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986) (specifying evidentiary standards apply when ruling on motions for
summary judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58588 (1986) (dictating standards courts of appeal use to evaluate district courts' motions for summary
judgment decisions).
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led to an increase in the number of cases disposed of by district judges.
Although reliable empirical evidence on the percentage increase in cases
disposed of by summary judgment as a result of these developments is
lacking,6 5 the evidence clearly shows that the numbers have increased by as

little as six percent to as much as seventy-three percent in some types of
cases. 6 6 In short, "we have moved from a world in which dispositions by

summary judgment were equal to a small fraction of dispositions by trial into
a new era in which dispositions by summary judgment are a magnitude
several times greater than the number of trials .'67 Regardless of the number
of times district judges disposed of cases on summary judgment, it is
important to note that they have the power to do so and parties are
increasingly filing motions for summary judgment where effective judicial
advocacy is crucial to whether the case survives for jury trial. Similarly, in
criminal cases, district judges can make dispositive rulings on motions to
dismiss and to suppress.68
D. Conflicting Timelines
Tracing the history of legal advocacy education and the history of

jury trials/appellate oral arguments allows us to compare them and recognize
how they once matched and no longer do. In summary, when law schools
adopted appellate advocacy programs approximately 20 percent of civil
cases proceeded to trial -many of which led to appellate oral arguments .69

Today, less than one percent of all federal civil cases proceed to trial,70
resulting in far fewer appeals; when cases are appealed, oral argument is

64 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 567-68 (discussing impact of adoption of civil discovery
A Quarter-Centuryof
rules and Rule 56 on motions practice increase); see also Joe S. Cecil et al.,
Summary Judgment Practicein Six FederalDistrict Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861,883
(2007) ("Over the 25-year period [from 1975 to 2000], the percentage of cases with one or more
summary judgment motions granted in whole or in part doubled from 6 percent to 12 percent.").
65 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 568 ("Reliable empirical evidence regarding the percentage
of cases resolved on summary judgment has proved difficult to obtain.").
66 See id. at 568-69 (presenting empirical findings of summary judgement adjudication).
Stephen Burbank's 2004 study concluded that, between 1960 and 2000, the number of federal civil
cases disposed of by summary judgment order increased from 1.8 percent to 7.7 percent. Id. More
recent data shows that courts granted summary judgment motions in 70 percent of civil rights cases
and 73 percent of employment discrimination cases. Id.
67 Galanter, supra note 40, at 484.
68 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 49 (indicating criminal disposition steady between seven to
eight percent from 1997 to 2018).
69 See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
70 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 49.
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granted in less than 20 percent of the cases. 71 Similarly, when jury trial
advocacy courses were introduced into American law schools in the 1970s,
approximately one in ten civil cases still proceeded to jury trial.72 Today,
less than one in a hundred federal civil cases proceed to jury trial. 73 The
numbers are not significantly better for criminal jury trials and appellate
arguments. In the meantime, the number of motions filed and decided by
district judges have increased significantly since law schools began teaching
jury trial advocacy. In particular, this includes the number of cases in which
judges make dispositive decisions affecting the survival of claims that could
end up before a jury. As to the extent American law schools are teaching
legal advocacy skills today, they are teaching skills that were once dominant
in a bygone litigation era and are failing to teach the skills modem litigators
increasingly use every day in courtrooms across America: advocating to
district judges.
IV. DIFFERENCES IN JUDGES, JURIES, AND APPELLATE COURTS
Some supporters of jury trial advocacy and appellate advocacy
programs argue that they have value in preparing students to argue in any
type of legal setting. 74 That may be true to a degree but there has been little
thought given to the difference between arguing to a jury or appellate bench
in comparison to arguing to a district judge. 75 As it turns out, there are
significant differences in the context in which the argument is made and the
nature of the decision-maker whom the advocate is attempting to persuade.
Thus, the skills learned in jury trial advocacy that focus on persuading a jury
71 See id.
72

See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.

73 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 49.
74 See Kritchevsky, supra note 10, at 47 ("Moot court is an established part of law school life

because it teaches valuable lessons that the rest of the curriculum leaves largely uncovered[,] ...
teaching skills that will help both in law school and in all areas of practice.") see also Finneran,
supra note 29, at 126-28 (arguing that appellate advocacy and jury trial advocacy courses teach
"the very skills that law students will need as future lawyers" and provide "exceptional preparation"
for other litigation tasks such as covering motion hearings).
75 See Roger S. Haydock, David F. Herr & Jeffery W. Stempel, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL
LITIGATION 637-89 (10th ed. 2016). There is very little in the literature on advocacy to district
judges and how it differs from arguing to a jury or an appellate panel. In "Fundamentals of Pretrial
Litigation", the authors devote a chapter to courtroom advocacy. See id. The focus, however, is
largely on written advocacy. See id. Although the book identifies some differences between
arguing to a judge and arguing to an appellate panel of judges, it does not contrast it to arguing to
a jury. See id.; see also MAUET, supra note 51, at 374. In his book on pretrial litigation, Professor
Mauet, the Director of Trial Advocacy at the University of Arizona Law School, makes only
passing references to and provides little advice for advocating to judges during hearings. See
MAUET, supra note 51, at 374.
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and the skills in appellate advocacy that focus on persuading an appellate
panel of judges are not wholly transferable to persuading a district judge.
Indeed, as I will discuss, some jury advocacy methods may not only be
inappropriate, inapplicable, or even ineffective when trying to advocate to a
judge.
There are many differences in advocating to juries, to a court of
appeals, and to judges, but primary differences generally fall into two broad
categories: context and the decision-maker. Within the context category,
there are differences in whether: (1) advocacy is written and oral, or only
oral; (2) facts are in dispute; and (3) evidence rules apply. Within the
decision-maker category, there are differences in whether: (1) group
decision-making occurs; (2) there are collateral pressures on the decisionmaker; (3) the decision-maker is legally trained; (4) the decision-maker is
knowable; (5) the advocate will reappear before the decision-maker; and (6)
the advocate and decision-maker can converse. Charting out these
differences helps illustrate where they occur.
Factor

Appeals

District

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
Yes
No

Yes
Often
Sometimes
No
Yes

Jury'

c~urt

Judge

Written & oral advocacy
Facts in dispute
Rules of evidence apply
Group decision-making
Collateral pressures on decisionmaker
Decision-maker trained in legal
reasoning
Decision-maker knowable

No

Yes

Yes

Limited

Yes

Yes

Reappear before decision-maker

No

Maybe

Yes

Conversation possible

No

Limited

Yes

I will discuss each of these differences in more detail below.
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A. Differences In Context
1.

Whether Advocacy is Written, Oral, or Both

When attorneys advocate to judges, they often use both written and
oral advocacy. Unlike jurors, judges make decisions based not just on what
is presented in the courtroom, in evidence, or during oral argument. Rather,
they also consider the written submissions of the parties in the form of
motions, responses, proposed findings of fact, and/or conclusions of law.
Attorneys file briefs or memoranda summarizing the relevant facts, setting
out the legal standards, and arguing why their clients should prevail. When
attorneys advocate to an appeals court, they always do so in writing and
sometimes (but as we have seen, decreasingly) orally. Frequently, both
district judges and appellate judges have reviewed the attorneys' briefs prior
to oral argument and-if they have not-they do so after oral argument.
Thus, unlike jurors, judges begin to form their views and opinions about
cases as a result of reading written submissions by the parties before the
attorneys make any courtroom presentation. Indeed, when judges read the
briefs in advance of argument, they may enter the hearings or oral arguments
already having a fair idea of how they will likely rule.76
Compare these advocacy practices to jury trials. Juries do not have
the benefit of reading written briefs summarizing the facts, stating the law,
or setting out the parties' arguments. Rather, they learn the facts and hear
the arguments through oral presentation only. Although judges instruct
juries on the law, instructions are to be neutral and not a form of attorney

advocacy ."
Consider, then, how this difference can affect legal advocacy. It is
well-known that people -including judges -comprehend and remember

76 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman's The ImpartialJudge:
Detachment or Passion?,45 DEPAuL L. REv. 633,634 (1996) (recognizing that judges "may form
an early impression about a case" from briefing). See generally Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing
the Writing-CenteredLegal Process, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1159 (2004) (discussing development and
influence of writing-centered American legal system compared to oral-centered English legal
system).
77 See, e.g., Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002)
("Rather than merely restating counsel's argument, jury instructions should be a neutral statement
of the law."); United States v. Martin, 274 F.3d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 2001) (approving jury
instruction because it was "accurate, clear, neutral, and non-prejudicial."); Bolden v. Beaupre, No.
07-4702 ADMIJSM, 2010 WL 2130858, at *4 (D. Minn. May 24, 2010) (noting that "jury
instructions are to be neutral.").
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8
things better when provided with both written and oral explanations.
Therefore, repetition may be a more important part of advocacy to jurors and
less necessary when judges are the decisionmakers. On the other handwhen attorneys advocate both written and orally-they must determine the
best way to weave those methods together. Attorneys who merely repeat
79
what they wrote in their briefs in oral argument are ineffective. Attorneys
must also consider the possibility that the judges may have already partially
made up their minds about the way they may rule based on the written briefs.
Therefore, attorneys must learn: (1) the skill of discerning what judges are
thinking; and (2) how to persuade judges to change their minds.

2.

Whether the Facts are in Dispute

The content and nature of an attorney's advocacy depends
significantly on whether the decision maker is also a fact-finder. Juries are
°
always fact-finders, and judges often play the role of fact-finder as well."
On the contrary, appellate court judges never act as fact-finders.
There is a fundamental difference in advocacy when facts are in
dispute versus when the facts are contained in a cold record. When attorneys
are advocating that a decision-maker find certain facts, it calls upon all of the
skills of rhetoric using pathos, ethos, and logos."8 Effective advocates either
intentionally or intuitively incorporate all three elements into their arguments
See, e.g., John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid
CriminalJuror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1211 (2002) (emphasizing increase
in comprehension and retention when oral delivery is supplemented by written materials); Robert
F. Forsten, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 BYU L. REV. 601, 609-10,
619-20, 631-33 (1975); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us
About the Jury InstructionProcess, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589,626 (1997). Cronan opines
that it is unrealistic to expect jurors-who are unfamiliar with the law-to comprehend and
remember what they only hear orally. Cronan, supra note 78, at 1200, 1244.
79 See ALAN D. HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 245-46 (1998)
(explaining why reading directly from brief is ineffective advocacy); see also William H.
Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A DisappearingArt, 35 MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1984) ("The
Supreme Court gets more advocates than it should who regard oral argument as a 'brief with
gestures."').
80 District judges often preside over evidentiary hearings in various forms. Occasionally, they
preside over hearings involving some form of fact-finding, such as motions for summary
judgement, where the parties provide the court with supposedly uncontested facts. In some cases,
a district judge may preside over hearings that do not involve any fact-finding, such as in motions
to dismiss, where the judge is bound by the four comers of the complaint.
81 See Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 86 (1994)
("Roman rhetoricians and lawyers like Cicero and Quintilian, relying on Aristotle's rhetorical
analyses, divided persuasive discourse, and legal arguments in particular, into three categories:
logical argument (logos), emotional argument (pathos), and ethical appeal or credibility (ethos).").
78
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to some degree when striving to persuade a fact-finder.8 2 The most talented
attorneys, however, recognize that the focus and emphasis on the elements
should vary, depending on the nature of the case. In some cases, logic is the
most compelling aspect of the argument, while in others, an appeal to
emotion is more likely to succeed. Hence, the familiar saying: "If the facts
are against you, argue the law. If the law is against you, argue the facts. If
the law and the facts are against you, pound the table and yell like hell."83
Attorneys must persuade the fact-finder to find the facts favorable to their
parties, and then explain how those facts support their legal positions.
Sometimes attorneys must use their rhetorical and reasoning skills to
persuade fact-finders that they should prevail even when fact-finders do not
find the facts to be as claimed.
On the other hand, attorneys argue to a court of appeals on a cold
record; this calls upon very different advocacy skills .84Sometimes attorneys
must use their rhetorical skills to bring the cold record to life, and attorneys
usually focus on the logos part of rhetoric to persuade appellate courts that
they should prevail as a matter of legal reasoning based on the facts
developed below . Even when facts are in dispute, how attorneys advocate
should change depending on whether the fact-finder is a jury or is a judge,
as will be explained in Section VI.B below.

82 See generally Hanrahan, supra note 29, at 329 (arguing that good attorneys use classical
rhetorical devices to make effective arguments).
83 See CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 181 (1937) ("'If the law is against you, talk about
the evidence,' said a battered barrister. 'If the evidence is against you, talk about the law, and, since
you ask me, if the law and the evidence are both against you, then pound on the table and yell like
hell."'). Interestingly, this saying has some variations. See David M. Wilson, Working Toward a
Common Goal: Are You One of Us?, 48 No. 3 DRI FOR DEF. 14, 14 (2006) ("Lore has it that
Abraham Lincoln, while lecturing a group of young lawyers, advised that 'If the facts are against
you, argue the law. If the law is against you, argue the facts. If the facts and the law are against
you, attack your opponent."').
84 See Mary Beth Beazley, Writing for a Mind at Work: Appellate Advocacy and the Science
of Digital Reading, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 415, 419 (2016) ("Appellate judges, of course, must 'solve
the problem' of the appeal by reviewing those attorney arguments as they appear in written briefs,
and by reading the relevant case law and the 'cold record."'); see also Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV
& Kenneth J. Bartschi, Fast ForwardEffective Family Law Appeals, 28 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 6 (2006)
(noting that "although trial court judges have a great deal of latitude to do what they believe is fair
and equitable, appellate judges review cases based on a cold record and employ formal standards
of review, such as the abuse of discretion standard. Arguments that might succeed in the trial court
may be doomed to failure in the appellate court.").
85 See Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 J. LEG.
WRITING 127, 162 (2008) (noting "tendency of appellate brief writers to focus on the logos at the
expense of the pathos.").
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3.

Whether the Rules of Evidence Apply

Although both jurors and judges serve as fact-finders, they do so
with different restrictions. When jurors serve as fact-finders, the rules of
evidence apply. Indeed, the purpose of evidence rules is to protect jurors
from unreliable evidence.86 This purpose is reflected in Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(c), which requires judges to conduct hearings regarding the
admissibility of evidence "so that the jury cannot hear it" under certain
circumstances or when "justice so requires. '"87 Consequently, effective
advocacy to juries involves presenting evidence that is admissible under the
rules and objecting to inadmissible evidence. Understandably then, a
significant amount of time in trial advocacy courses is spent working on
skills tied to getting evidence admitted under the rules of evidence.
In stark contrast, when judges serve as fact-finders, the rules of
evidence often do not apply at all, and even when they do apply, they apply
in a "relaxed" manner. 88 Because it is understood that the Federal Rules of
Evidence were designed to protect unsophisticated jurors from unreliable
evidence and the chicanery of clever counsel, it is not surprising that the
Federal Rules of Evidence would not generally apply when judges serve as
fact-finders. In theory, trained judges are experienced in analyzing evidence
and are familiar with the chicanery of counsel; therefore, they do not need
the protection that evidence rules provide to laypersons. Thus, it makes
sense, for instance, that in making evidentiary rulings, judges are not bound
89
by any of the Federal Rules of Evidence "except those on privilege."
Similarly, Rule 1101(d) states that the Federal Rules do not apply in many
proceedings when judges act as fact-finders, particularly in criminal cases.9°
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20- CENTURY 266 (2002) ("It is
thanks almost entirely to the jury that we have a huge, lumbering body of doctrine and practice
called the law of evidence."). As Professor Wigmore, a famous expert on the rules of evidence,
once explained, the rules of evidence are "based on the purpose of saving the jurors from being
misled" due to jurors' "inexperience in analyzing evidence, and their unfamiliarity with the
chicanery of counsel." 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 125 (2d ed. 1923); see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 135 (1 st ed. 1973) (noting that American law distrusts
jurors because "[t]he jury only hears part of the story; that part which the law of evidence allows.").
87 FED. R.EVID. 104(c).
88 See sources cited infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
86

89 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a
witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not
bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege." (emphasis added)).
90 See FED. R. EViD. 1101(d) (stating Federal Rules of Evidence, "except for those on
privilege" do not apply to "miscellaneous proceedings"). These miscellaneous proceedings
include: (1) extradition or rendition; (2) issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search
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The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in detention hearings,9 '
suppression hearings,92 or sentencing hearings, for example. 93
Thus, attorneys advocating to judges in hearings where the rules of
evidence do not apply should consider the implications. Evidence that would
be inadmissible under the rules is admissible when the rules do not apply.
Attorneys cannot object to the admission of evidence by invoking evidence
rules that do not apply. That is not to say, however, that evidence rules are
irrelevant even in hearings where they do not apply. Judges are trained in
the rules of evidence and will be more skeptical of evidence that would not
be admissible under the applicable evidence rules. Knowing this, effective
attorneys should still strive to present evidence that would be admissible
under the rules. Alternatively, attorneys should present evidence in a way
that would bolster the reliability of the evidence, even if the evidence would
not comply with the rules of evidence. Also, in argument, attorneys should
acknowledge such evidence, understand the reasons for the various rules,
and use these reasons to persuade the judge about what weight to give the
evidence .14

warrant; (3) preliminary examination in a criminal case; (4) sentencing hearings; (5) probation and
revocation hearings; and (6) detention hearings. See id. at 1101(d)(3).
91 See FED.R. EVID. 11Ol(d)(3) ("The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply
in the following situations: ... proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise.").
92 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1974); see also 3A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, PETER J. HENNING, SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 689 (4th ed. 2010) (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172-73) ("The rules of evidence do
not apply in a suppression hearing and hearsay is admissible.").
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (holding
that lower evidentiary standard at sentencing permits sentencing court's consideration of acquitted
conduct); see also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-401 (1995) (noting that sentencing
court traditionally considered range of information including criminal conduct and subsequent
prosecution); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747-48 (1994) (noting district courts
considered defendant's prior criminal conduct even when it did not result in conviction).
94 For instance, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) prohibits admission of character evidence to
prove a person acted in conformity with that character because the rule drafters believed a person's
character is a poor predictor of behavior. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); see also CJ. Williams &
Dasha Ternavska, A Series of Unfortunate Events: The Admissibility of "Other Fires" Evidence in
Arson Cases, 48 CONN. L. REV. 685,697-98 (2016) (explaining rationale behind Rule 404(a)(1)).
On the other hand, Rule 406 permits admission of habit evidence for the purpose of showing a
person acted on a particular occasion consistent with that habit because of the belief that a habit is
a good predictor of behavior. See FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note (noting general
consensus that "the uniformity of one's response to habit is far greater than the consistency with
which one's conduct conforms to character or disposition"). In other instances, the Federal Rules
of Evidence prohibit admission of evidence for policy reasons. For example, Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 bars admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures because we, as a
society, want people or companies to take remedial measures to prevent future harms. See FED. R.
EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (stating that Rule 407 rests in part on "a social policy of
encouraging people to take, or at least not discourage them from taking, steps in furtherance of
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The Federal Rules of Evidence do apply in some settings, such as in
95
all bench trials, when judges serve as fact-finders. Even then, though, not

all of the Federal Rules of Evidence apply when a judge is a fact-finder in a
bench trial, or at least do not apply to the same degree as they do when a jury
is the fact-finder. For example, Rule 403 provides that "[t]he court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence. '"96
Courts have held, however, that Rule 403 is either unnecessary or
"relaxed significantly" when a judge is the fact-finder. 97 The same is true of

Rule 404(b).98 Courts reason that a judge "can hear relevant evidence, weigh

99
its probative value and reject any improper inferences." Similarly, there is
little need in bench trials for so-called Daubertmotions to bar admission of
expert testimony because "[t]he main purpose of Daubert exclusion is to
1°
protect juries from being swayed by dubious scientific testimony."
Indeed, courts have held that all evidence rules are generally relaxed when a

added safety"). The point is that attorneys need to understand the reasoning underlying each rule
to effectively advocate to a judge, even when the rules of evidence do not apply.
95 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The district
court erred when it admitted this evidence on the ground that hearsay is admissible in a bench trial;
it is not.").
96 FED. R. EViD. 403 ("Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time,
or Other Reasons").
97 See United States v. Musleh, 106 F. App'x 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2004); see also United States
v. Hall, No. 98-6421, 2000 WL 32010, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating Rule 403 has little or no
application during bench trial); Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Adopting
the position taken in Gulf States, we hold that in the context of a bench trial, evidence should not
be excluded under 403 on the ground that it is unfairly prejudicial."); Gulf States Utils. Co. v.
Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517,519 (5th Cir. 1981) (excluding relevant evidence in a bench trial on
basis of unfair prejudice is useless and illogical). Courts have also acknowledged that judges have
more "leeway" in receiving questionable evidence (including expert witness evidence) during a
bench trial. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 780 (10th
Cir. 2009) ("[A] judge conducting a bench trial maintains greater leeway in admitting questionable
evidence, weighing its persuasive value upon presentation."); Rogers v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l,
988 F.2d 607, 612 (5th Cir. 1993) ("In a bench trial ... the district court has more leeway in
evaluating the admissibility of evidence since it is both the arbiter of admissibility and the finder
of fact."); Thames v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-425-PJC, 2015 WL 3398147, at *2 (N.D.
Okla. May 26, 2015) ("When set for bench trial, the Court has more leeway in its gatekeeper role,
but it still must consider whether expert evidence or testimony is admissible.").
98 See United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574,578 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding admission of
evidence in bench trial did not violate Rule 404(b), but noting a judge can "separate the emotional
impact from the probative value of this potentially prejudicial evidence.").
9 Schultz, 24 F.3d at 632 (stating intent of Rule 403 and ability of judges to implement it).
1ot In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) (outlining purpose of Daubert motion).
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judge is the fact-finder. 0 1 For that reason, judges are "entitled to greater
latitude in evidentiary rulings," when they are fact-finders and will be
reversed "only where they affect a substantial right of the complaining
party.' 10 2 Thus, judges often prefer to err on the side of caution by admitting
evidence when they serve as fact-finders, even if the evidence may be
inadmissible under a strict adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
because judges are able to afford the evidence appropriate weight. 0 3
In general, then, judges are generally expected to apply the rules of
evidence in bench trials and bar inadmissible evidence. In ruling on the
admissibility of the evidence, however, judges must necessarily see or hear
the evidence to rule on its admissibility. This conundrum requires judges to
exercise mental discipline to disregard and ignore evidence they just saw,
and that may be very difficult to do in some instances. 0 4 Judges are assumed

101 See Null v. Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Strict evidentiary rules of
admissibility are generally relaxed in bench trials .... "); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986) ("... the nonmoving party [need not] produce evidence in a form that would
be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment."); United States v. Raymond, 697 F.3d
32, 39 n.6 (1st Cir. 2012) ("It is at least arguable that, in a bench trial, a district court has wider
latitude in the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence." (dictum)); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.
v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Virginia, Inc., 64 F.3d 920,926 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting
that although inadmissible evidence is "ordinarily an inadequate basis for summary judgment," the
rule is "not unfailingly rigid."); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cit. 1980) ("[T]he strict
rules of evidence do not apply in an administrative context."). But see In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig.,
173 F.3d 145, 164 (3d Cit. 1999) (Becker, J., dissenting) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence apply
with full force to bench trials." (citing FED. R. EVD. l101(b) and 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2411 (2d ed. 1995) ("In theory, the
Federal Rules of Evidence apply equally in court trials and jury trials.")). It should be noted that
Rule 1101(b) does not say anything about bench trials. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(b).
102 James Corp. of Opelousas v. Tangie Const. Co., Inc., No. 93-4828, 1993 WL 413912, at
*3 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 1993) (citations omitted) (identifying appropriate standard of review for
challenges to evidentiary rulings); see BIC Corp. v. Far Eastern Source Corp., 23 F. App'x 36, 39
(2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he admission of evidence in a bench trial is rarely ground for reversal, for the
trial judge is presumed to be able to exclude improper inferences from his or her own decisional
analysis.").
103 See In re Unisys, 173 F.3d at 172 (Becker, J., dissenting) ("'In nonjury cases the
district
court can commit reversible error by excluding evidence but it is almost impossible for it to do so
by admitting evidence."' (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 101, at § 2885)); see also Van
Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 560 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that, although trial
judge ruled otherwise, "ordinarily it may be the more prudent course in a bench trial to admit into
evidence doubtfully admissible records .... ); Dreyfus Ashby, Inc. v. S/S "Rouen," No. 88 CIV.
2890 (MBM), 1989 WL 151685, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1989) (stating that "all doubts at a bench
trial should be resolved in favor of admissibility, [but] that cannot mean that standards are out the
window entirely.").
104 See RALPH ADAM FINE, THE HOW-TO-WIN TRIAL MANUAL: A No-HOLDS-BARRED
SURE-FIRE WAY TO WIN 578 (6th Ed. 2015) (opining that for "bench trial judge to ignore the
evidence that he or she has excluded from the trial requires 'a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
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to have the mental discipline to disregard inadmissible evidence.
Nevertheless, attorneys must recognize the conundrum and address this issue
if they want to effectively advocate to a judge as a fact-finder.
Attorneys can raise evidentiary issues before trial by filing motions
10 5 The purpose of a motion in
in limine, or during the trial by objecting.
limine is to allow a judge to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility of
certain forecasted evidence so as to prevent a jury from being exposed to
unreliable evidence.106 Thus, motions in limine further a judge's gatekeeping
responsibility to eliminate from consideration evidence that should not be
07
presented to the jury because it would not be admissible for any purpose.
When a judge is the fact-finder, though, the motions in limine are generally
inappropriate. 10 8
In short, the way attorneys advocate is greatly impacted by whether
evidence rules apply, and whether and how they apply depends on whether
the fact-finder is a jury or a judge.

not only [the judge's] powers, but anybody's .... "' (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006,
1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
105 Motion in Limine, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1 th ed. 2019) (defining a motion in limine
as "[a] pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence not be referenced to or offered at trial"
and noting that attorneys typically make these motions because the evidence is so highly prejudicial
that waiting to object at trial is may cause a mistrial).
106 See Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) ("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's
inherent authority to manage the course of trials.").
107 See Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Serv., 115 F.3d 436,440 (7th Cir. 1997).
The motion in limine is an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the
expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings. It performs a
gatekeeping function and permits the trial judge to eliminate from further consideration
evidentiary submissions that clearly ought not be presented to the jury because they
clearly would be inadmissible for any purpose. The prudent use of the in limine motion
sharpens the focus of later trial proceedings and permits the parties to focus their
preparation on those matters that will be considered by the jury.
Id.

108 See Randy Wilson, From My Side of the Bench, 47 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 92 (2009)
("[A]lthough you'd think it goes without saying, a motion in limine doesn't work with a bench trial.
I wish I could say I've never seen one before in a bench trial; unfortunately, I cannot."). The only
exception might be when an order granting a motion in limine would significantly impact the trial,
such as by eliminating a witness. See United States v. Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Motions in limine are well-established devices that streamline trials and settle evidentiary
disputes in advance, so that trials are not interrupted mid-course for the consideration of lengthy
and complex evidentiary issues.").
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B. The Decision-Maker
1.

Whether Group Decision-making Occurs

As decisionmakers, individual judges differ much more significantly
from juries than they do from individual jurors. Judges comprehend and
retain information in the same manner as jurors. They learn from hearing and
seeing, in response to aural and visual stimuli. In short, judges employ
similar cognitive processes, subject to the same limitations, as any other
human.

09

In hearings and bench trials, though, judges are juries of one. Gone
are both the negative and positive attributes of group decision-making.110
The danger of group-think is absent. Judges do not face the peer pressure
influencing their decisions during the judges' internal mental deliberations.
Also missing, however, are the advantages of the exchange of multiple
viewpoints and different perspectives, the pooling of memories, and the
dynamics that occur in group decision-making."' The benefits of sounding
out ideas, bouncing around possible solutions, debating points, and
12
brainstorming are unavailable when a judge alone must reach a decision."

109 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13, 29 (2007) (explaining that judges employ
intuition subconsciously to make decisions); see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251, 1292 (2005) (concluding that judges are unable to
avoid being influenced by inadmissible information); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778, 786 (2001) (stating
that judges are just as susceptible to making errors in judgment as lay people).
110 See IRVING L. JANIS,GROUPTHINK 7,270-71 (2d ed. 1972) (discussing group think among
jurors); see also Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since Furman, Is the Death
Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital
Sentencing, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1399, 1447 (2004) (discussing negative effects of group think
among jurors, particularly in death penalty cases).
111 See Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of
Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727,749-50 (1991) (discussing
benefits of group decision-making by jurors).
112 See id. (describing benefits of group decision-making by jurors). In some instances, judges
may talk out decisions with law clerks. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A
HANDBOOK FOR LAW CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 1 (Sylvan A. Sobel ed., 2d ed. 2007) ("Many
judges discuss pending cases with their law clerks and confer with them about decisions."); Judge
William E. Smith, Reflections on JudicialMerit Selection, the Rhode Island Experience and Some
Modest Proposalsfor Reform andImprovement, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 664,697 (2010)
(discussing benefits of elbow law clerk with whom judges can "bounce ideas off"). A law clerk
may have been present during the hearing or trial and may have seen the same evidence the judge
saw. Even then, though, the group dynamic is significantly different not only because of the fewer
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Unlike district judges, but like juries, appellate judges engage in a
of
form group decision-making. Appellate judges discuss and debate cases
before them, and are influenced both positively and negatively by the input
of their fellow judges." 3 Like district judges, but unlike juries, however,
appellate judges ultimately reach individual decisions and are not bound to
reach a unanimous decision. An appellate judge may always issue a
concurring or a dissenting opinion; jurors cannot.
2.

Whether There are Collateral Pressures on the Decision-maker

Judges have significant responsibilities that come with their power,
and those responsibilities can influence how they make decisions. Many of
these responsibilities are unique to district judges and are not present with
appellate judges. Judges must listen to testimony, consider evidence, and
hear attorneys' arguments, but judges are also responsible to ensure that
witnesses are treated with respect and that attorneys conduct themselves in a
professional and ethical manner. 14 While a district judge may be trying to
concentrate on the case at hand, the judge is simultaneously responsible for
watching the clock and thinking of other cases and other litigants so as to
number of people involved but also because of the disparate power relationship between a judge
and a law clerk.
113 See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Justiceand More Judges, 15 J.L. & POL.
559, 563 (1999) ("[A] collegiality of judges who know one another well enough to think alike and
through that group think to achieve a coherent and stable body of law."); see also Chrisje Brants,
Wrongful Convictions and InquisitorialProcess:The Case of the Netherlands, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
1069, 1111-12 (2012) (concluding analysis on pitfalls of judicial system).
One of the more troubling aspects of a career judiciary, however, is that experience can
degenerate into routine, so that panels of judges feel no need to explain to each other
what the strength or weakness of the case are as all will understand them, and that in
general a process of group-think governs deliberations.
Brants, supra note 113, at 1111-12.
114 See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(2) (JUD. CONF. 2019) (stating that
judges "should maintain order and decorum in all judicial proceedings."); see also id. at Canon
3(A)(3) (continuing list of judicial responsibilities).
A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. A judge
should require similar conduct by those subject to the judge's control, including lawyers
to the extent consistent with their role in the adversary process.
Id. See FED. R. EVID. 611 ("The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order
of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for
determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.").
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remain mindful of limited judicial resources. Judges struggle to find the
proper balance between permitting the parties the full benefit and duration
of their day in court against the need to allow time for every other litigant to
have the same opportunity. Judges are aware that additional briefing,
evidence, and argument will cost the parties more in attorneys' fees and
expenses while delaying disposition. Judges recognize they need to reach
reasoned and thoughtful decisions, but also feel the pressure of the need for
a speedy resolution of every case, knowing that parties need and deserve
timely decisions."' All of these practical considerations that are a product
of a judge's responsibility affect the manner in which judges consider and
decide cases.
Jurors, in contrast, generally do not consider any of these practical
and collateral matters when they are asked to reach decisions. Nor do
appellate judges face these issues when, on appeal, time constraints are
largely absent. There are no equivalent statutes or rules that compel or urge
appellate judges to reach speedy resolutions of appeals.
The presence of collateral pressures can impact effective advocacy.
Attorneys should be alert to whether collateral pressures are affecting a
judge's ability to concentrate on the evidence or argument. Attorneys should
also endeavor to be more concise with judges than they are with jurors.
Attorneys need to ensure they are timely with written pleadings because

115

See Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges,and Evidence ProductionProtocols,

45 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 133, 145 (2012) ("[J]udges often face significant pressure to move their
dockets efficiently."). The need for efficient litigation is compelled in federal criminal cases by the
Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008) (requiring that cases proceed "at the earliest
practicable time."). In federal civil cases, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure urge rapid
resolution of cases by requiring judges to construe, administer, and employ them in such a manner
that "secure[s] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(5) (JUD. CONF. 2019)
("A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court."). The commentary to Canon
3A(5) elaborates on this duty and reflects the tension between a judge's need to give parties their
days in court and the limited number of days in a year. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES cmt.
Canon 3A(5) (JUD. CONF. 2019).
In disposing of matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly, a judge must demonstrate due
regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without
unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should monitor and supervise cases to reduce or
eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs.
Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to
judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters
under submission, and to take reasonable measures to ensure that court personnel,
litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end.
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delays in filing may impact the judge's ability to focus and give sufficient
time to the matter.
3.

Whether the Decision-maker is Legally Trained

Judges, like jurors, are human. Judges have emotions (perhaps some
others) and thus can have emotional responses to evidence.
than
more
Judges also have their fair share of biases, preconceptions, and presumptions
as a result of their backgrounds, histories, and experiences.

Judges are

different from jurors, however, because of their legal training.
As students in law school, judges were required to master deductive
reasoning. Then, through their experience as attorneys, they honed their
analytical skills and disciplined their minds to focus on material facts and
issues. Like doctors, judges, through their education and experience,
developed the ability to wall themselves off emotionally from cases and to

approach cases with something akin to clinical detachment.'I

6

As attorneys,

and even more so after obtaining a spot on the bench, judges focus on facts
that have legal significance and disregard facts that do not. Judges are also

members of the same social and professional class as attorneys, sharing the
same language, having similar formative experiences, and being bound by

similar core rules of ethics and values.7 When attorneys are talking to
judges, then, they are talking to one of their own. This is very dissimilar to
attorneys talking to jurors.
Because judges are legally trained and mentally disciplined to make
dispassionate decisions based on reason and logic, appeals to emotion, the
pathos part of classical rhetoric, not only find little purchase with judges but
may be seen as insulting by suggesting that judges would make a decision
based on emotion.'18 On the other hand, when jurors are fact-finders,
116 See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1494
(2011) ("Many judges will, over the course of their careers, develop sound and flexible strategies
for coping with emotion."). Some debate exists in academic circles about whether judges should,
or even really do, separate their decision-making from their emotions. See Bruce A. Green &
Rebecca Roiphea, JudicialActivism in Trial Courts, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 365, 379-84
(2019) ("[Ilf achievable, it is questionable whether impersonal justice in this sense is desirable.").
117 See Paul Holland, Sharing Stories: NarrativeLawyering in Bench Trials, 16 CLINICAL L.
REV. 195,268 (2009) (noting that bench trials are different from jury trials because as "[m]embers
of the same profession, judges and lawyers share a vocabulary, a code of ethics, certain formative
experiences (such as law school and the bar exam) and a responsibility for justice.").
118 See Hon. David J. Newblatt, How to Convince the Judge on Motion Day in Family Court,
85 MICH. BJ. 16, 17 (2006) ("Judges are trained and experienced. Judges will not be persuaded by
gratuitous personal attacks. Hyperbole lost its effect long ago. We can tell baloney from substance
and can tell whether you know the law and the facts. Talk to the judge at the judge's level.");
Larkins, supra note 9, at 17 ("Although a judge, like a jury, wants to understand where justice lies
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attorneys may want to emphasize the emotional appeal of their position over
a logical argument. Thus, when arguing to judges, attorneys should usually
focus on the law and the facts. Although attorneys should be emphatic on
important points, they should leave drama and theatrics for juries. Judges
are not persuaded by such displays; indeed, vociferous oral advocacy may
have just the opposite effect.'19 Judges expect attorneys to speak to them on
an intellectual level, with an emphasis on reasoning and common sense and
not on emotions. In short, attorneys should emphasize logos over pathos.
4.

Whether the Decision-maker is Knowable

A fundamental tenet of effective public speaking is to know one's
audience. There is a tremendous difference between what attorneys can
know about jurors and what attorneys can know about judges. Voir dire
enables attorneys to learn limited information about prospective jurors in
order for attorneys to make more informed for-cause challenges and to
exercise peremptory strikes .120 Juror questionnaires 121 private investigation
of prospective jurors,'122 and jury consultants' 2 3 can supplement voir dire to
provide attorneys with more information about prospective jurors. In the
end, however, the information trial attorneys have about individual jurors is
limited and imperfect, restricted by access, time, and money.

in the case, a judge will rarely have a favorable reaction to an emotional or inflammatory appeal.
In fact, the judge's usual reaction to such "jury argument" is to be professionally offended.").
119 See Brian Wice, Oral Argument in Criminal Cases: 10 Tips for Winning the Moot Court
Round, 69 TEX.B.J. 224,225 (2006) ("Remember that your forum is an appellate court, not a trial
court, and that your audience is composed not of jurors but of appellate judges. Some of the most
talented criminal trial lawyers are far from stellar when they take on the mantle of appellate warrior.
Why? Because they are unable or unwilling to recognize that the same table-pounding argument
and incendiary prose that may carry the day in the trial court will be laughed at by the appellate
judges whom they hold hostage for 20 minutes. It is logic, not emotion, that is the foundation of a
compelling oral argument.").
120 See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (explaining that jury voir dire enables
courts to select impartial juries and assists attorneys in exercising peremptory strikes). Effective
trial attorneys also use that information to tailor the presentation of their evidence and argument to
the particular audience of jury ultimately selected.
121 See Rachael A. Ream, Limited Voir Dire: Why it Failsto Detect JurorBias, 23 CRIM. JUST.
22, 26 (2009) (discussing role of written questionnaires in jury selection).
122 See generally Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the DigitalAge: One Click at
a Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 616-18 (2012) (discussing history of jury research and use of
private investigators conducting "field investigations" on prospective jurors).
123 See generally Katherine Allen, The Jury: Modern Day Investigationand Consultation,34
REV. LMG. 529, 538-41 (2015) (discussing use of jury consultants in researching prospective
jurors and assisting in jury selection).
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Judges, on the other hand, are more of an open book. As public
officials, much is known about judges and attorneys can learn even more
with a little effort. There is a treasure trove of information about judges in
the public domain, particularly for federal judges whose lengthy and detailed
Senate Judicial Questionnaires are publicly filed. Many judges also provide
information about their preferences and practices on court websites. Judges
often speak publicly at conferences about their preferences and practices or
publish articles in bar journals or law reviews. Hearings and trials take place
in open court, so anyone can observe judges' practices and procedures.
Finally, other attorneys are an available source of information about judges'
past practices and procedures.
Of course, the important thing is what trial attorneys do with the
information that they have about decision-makers. All too often trial
attorneys use the limited information they know about prospective jurors
only to decide whom to challenge for cause or remove using a peremptory
strike. Trial attorneys often fail to consider juror information in tailoring the
presentation of their cases to the jurors. Instead of adjusting and modifying
the presentation of the evidence and their arguments to better appeal to the
background, abilities, and views of the jurors, trial attorneys simply present
their cases as if all jurors and juries are the same. Similarly, trial attorneys
all too often present their cases to judges in hearings and bench trials as if all
judges were alike. Instead, attorneys should adjust their presentations based
on the judge's experience and familiarity with the subject matter and law of
the particular case. 12 4 To be effective advocates to judges, attorneys should
find out what the judge knows about the subject matter and the legal issues.
How an attorney advocates can be affected by how familiar the judge is with
the case based on handling similar issues in prior cases.
5.

Whether the Advocate Will Reappear Before the Decisionmaker

Juries are comprised of individuals gathered together based on very
few basic criteria and then whittled down through an empanelment process.
This results in each jury being unique. Thus, attorneys will never appear
again before the same jury. Indeed, most courts excuse jurors from further

124

See Sara Klco & Francisco Armada, Tips for Young Lawyers, 37 No. 3 TRIAL ADVOC.

Q.

13, 13 (2018) (urging young lawyers arguing cases before district judges to "[k]now your audience.
Consider your judge's background and experience handling the issue you are asking him or her to
address and tailor your pleadings and arguments based on that background and experience.").

2020]

ADVOCATING ALTERING ADVOCACY ACADEMICS

231

service for some period of time once they have served, so it is highly likely
that attorneys will never again see even an individual juror again.
Appellate panels are somewhat similar in that they are typically
comprised of three appellate judges randomly assigned to the case. It is
possible, depending on the nature of an attorney's practice and the frequency
of appearing in the court of appeals, that an attorney could appear before the
same panel more than once on different cases. It is likely that any attorney
with a regular appellate practice will appear before the same appellate judges
repeatedly, albeit on different panels.
Except in the largest districts with scores of judges, in contrast,
attorneys will regularly appear before the same district judges over and over
again. Whether an attorney will reappear before a decision-maker can affect
advocacy. Attorneys need not worry about future consequences with juries.
Attorneys can take inconsistent positions from one jury to the next; they can
engage insharp practices before a jury without worrying about how it may
affect them in the future in other cases; they can exaggerate and bluff without
being concerned that it could affect their future credibility. Not so with
judges, whether they be district or appellate judges. Attorneys must always
consider the reputation they form with judges before whom they may or will
reappear.125 Moreover, attorneys are bound by ethical rules to be candid with
the court. 1 2 6 And judges have power over attorneys, who are officers of the

court and answerable to judges for misconduct. Judges and attorneys
recognize that what judges say and how judges render their decisions can, in
some cases, impact attorneys' careers for better or worse.
6.

Whether the Advocate and Decision-maker Can Converse

Judges differ significantly from juries as decision-makers because
judges have the ability to, and often do, ask questions of witnesses and
attorneys. Jurors cannot ask questions of attorneys and in most cases, jurors
remain mute observers.2 7 This difference significantly alters how attorneys
125

See Larkins, supra note 9, at 70 ("Every appearance before a judge inevitably affects every

case the lawyer or his firm has or will have before that judge."); J. Thomas Greene, OralArgument
in the District Court,26 LITIG. 3, 59 (2000) ("Remember, you may lose the particular motion, but
the outcome of any case seldom turns on a single decision. Continued civility coupled with
meticulous preparation inevitably will carry the day (and the judge)- if not in this case, then in the
next.").
126 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019) ("A lawyer shall
not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal ....
").
127 See Peter B. Krupp, When Jurors Speak: A Practical Guide to Jurors Questioning
Witnesses in Massachusetts, 45 BOS. BAR J. 12, 12 (2001) ("For most of this country's history,
jurors have sat through trials as mute lay observers of an oftentimes technical dialogue between

232

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXV

advocate to jurors and how they advocate to judges. Attorneys and judges
can have a conversation and through that conversation achieve a level of
understanding that cannot occur when attorneys are talking at jurors.
Attorneys can ask judges if their arguments are understood, and inquire of
judges about what questions or concerns judges have about the evidence or
argument. Although a judge may ultimately disagree with an attorney's
position, through conversation it can at least be certain that the judge
understands the attorney's position.
The opportunity for a true conversation is greater with district judges
that it is in an appellate setting. Appellate arguments are rigid and timed
with even the longest of them seldom exceeding a half-hour per side (and
most often are limited to ten or fifteen minutes per side). Appellate
arguments have the tone and appearance of formal debates. To the extent
there is an exchange, it resembles much more an interrogation than a
conversation, with only one side asking questions.' 28 Although district
judges have time pressures unlike appellate judges, most district judges do
not impose arbitrary and short deadlines to arguments. Thus, with district
judges there is a real opportunity for a more full and informal exchange to
take place. Advocacy to a district judge, then, assumes a very different tone
and can become much more of a conversation than a formal appellate
presentation.
In summary, there are important differences in effective advocacy to
judges, juries, and appellate courts. In this Part, I have only touched upon
the most obvious and significant differences to highlight the need to
recognize that all advocacy is not the same. Teaching effective advocacy
skills to law students requires identifying the differences in advocacy skills
necessary to persuade different decision-makers and tailoring the skills
training to address those differences. When combined with Part I of this
Article, which emphasized the dramatic drop in the number of jury trials and
appellate arguments, and with the perspective from Part II of the article that
points out that law schools have been focusing advocacy education on a
bygone era of litigation, the need to change the pedagogical approach to
lawyers, judges and witnesses."). Some judges do permit jurors to ask questions of witnesses, at
least after the questions are screened by the judge. My former colleague, Judge Mark W. Bennett,
a true judicial innovator, was among those who engaged in the practice and advocated for it. See
generally Hon. Justice Thomas D. Waterman, Hon. Judge Mark W. Bennett, & David C. Waterman,
A Fresh Look at Jurors Questioning Witnesses: A Review of Eighth Circuit and Iowa Appellate
Precedents and an EmpiricalAnalysis of Federaland State Trial Judges and Trial Lawyers, 64
DRAKE L. REV.485, 488, 525 (2016) (noting advantages of allowing jurors to ask witnesses
questions).
128 See HORNSTEIN, supra note 79, at 242 ("Finally, and perhaps most important, questions
initiated by the advocate to the court are simply inappropriate.").
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advocacy becomes crystal clear. In the final Part of this Article, I will
suggest how I believe we should structure law school advocacy education to
meet the changing world of litigation in America.
V. DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO LEGAL
ADVOCACY
Traditional courses on jury trial and appellate advocacy remain
valuable despite the decrease in the number of cases that result in jury trials
or appellate oral arguments. Indeed, teaching these skills in law school is,
perhaps, even more critical because young attorneys will get so little
practical experience in real courts. These courses teach students how to
research, reason, and write; how to identify and present admissible evidence;
and how to formulate and make coherent and persuasive arguments. To
respond to the evolving litigation landscape then, the solution lies not in
eliminating these courses but in supplementing and altering the courses.
One major flaw in the jury trial advocacy and appellate advocacy
programs offered at law schools today is that they are not integrated. No
thought is given or instruction provided to students about how advocacy
skills should be adapted and changed depending on the context and the
decision-maker. Similarly, the appellate advocacy courses do not flow out
of or are an extension of the trial advocacy courses. Appeals in the realworld flow from trials in the lower courts; thus, appellate advocacy courses
should as well. The ideal advocacy program, then, would address the stages
of advocacy in the order in which they occur in litigation. This would help
students understand the differences and comprehend how decisions and
developments at one stage of litigation directly affects later stages of
litigation.
What I propose is a series of three one-semester, interconnected
courses that would take students from pretrial litigation, through jury trial,
and onto appeal using the same case problem. The first course would be on
pretrial litigation and would (1) have students draft a motion and opposition
to a motion and (2) argue that motion to a district judge in a mock hearing.
The title of this course should appropriately be Judicial Advocacy. The
Judicial Advocacy course should be a mandatory course and replace the role
of the required appellate advocacy course in teaching students the basics of
research, writing, and oral advocacy. 129 Indeed, a Judiciary Advocacy course

129

See Hanrahan, supra note 29, at 300 ("Increasingly, judges have complained of the lack of

talented and skilled orators that argue in their courtrooms[,]" and noting that "[u]nfortunately, most
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makes far more sense as a basic required course as far more law students
will, in practice, find themselves filing motions and making arguments
before district judges, administrative law judges, and other judicial officers
than will ever find themselves in front of a jury or panel of appellate
judges. 130

The motion could involve either a civil motion, like a motion for
summary judgment, or a criminal motion, like a motion to suppress. Ideally,
though, the case problem should be based on a criminal prosecution and
involve a motion to suppress evidence. Students would then learn the
difference in advocacy in a setting where the rules of evidence do not
apply.13 In civil cases, it is less common for judges to hear evidence except
in certain motions, such as a motion for a preliminary injunction, and other
procedural postures that would not be as amenable to a first-year law school
mock setting.
The second course on Trial Advocacy would be an elective upper
level course offered to 2Ls or 3Ls in the fall semester. This course would
largely be identical to the trial advocacy courses now offered in law schools,
involving a mock jury trial at the end, with two proposed alterations. First,
the case problem would be the same one used in the first-year Judicial
Advocacy class. Students would now be taking to trial the very problem on
which they previously litigated pretrial motions. In doing so, students could
develop a better understanding of how pretrial litigation can directly affect
the posture of the case at trial. The second alteration would be a greater
emphasis on the differences between a jury trial and a bench trial. Although
the mock trial should still be before a jury, the course instruction should
include more discussion about how advocacy would be different were the
fact-finder a judge and not a jury.
The third course on Appellate Advocacy would also be an elective
upper-level course offered to 2Ls or 3Ls in the spring semester. This course
would largely be identical to the appellate advocacy courses now offered in
law schools, involving brief writing and mock appellate oral arguments, but
with two alterations again. First, the case problem would be the same one
law students have only one experience with oral argument (the first-year moot court competition),
and even less receive actual training in oral argument during law school.").
130 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 207 (arguing that law schools offer far too little instruction
on handing pretrial motions even though such pretrial motions are "precisely the tasks newly
admitted lawyers [are] likely to confront during their first years of practice."); Finneran, supra note
29, at 127-28 (noting that new attorneys rarely get to question witnesses during jury trials and are
much more likely to cover motion hearings); Greene, supra note 125, at 4 ("[O]ral argument is of
equal if not greater importance in the district courts than it is in the courts of appeals.").
131 FED. R. EvID. 1101 ("These rules ...do not apply to ...the court's determination ... on
a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility.").
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used in the Judicial Advocacy and Trial Advocacy courses. By arguing and
maneuvering the same case through this entire course series, the students will
develop a better understanding of how pretrial rulings and the record made
at trial directly impact the posture of the case on appeal. Second, the trial
advocacy course should be a prerequisite for the appellate advocacy course.
Learning appellate advocacy without first having a foundation of pretrial and
trial litigation presents the subject in an artificial and detached setting.
The three-course advocacy-track program would address the issues
identified in this Article. A first-year required course on judicial advocacy
recognizes and would prepare students for a world of litigation where jury
trials and appellate oral arguments are becoming increasingly rare, while the
need to effectively advocate to judges is increasingly important. An upperlevel, two-course interconnected program of trial and appellate advocacy
would, in combination with the first-year course on judicial advocacy,
provide students with an understanding of how effective advocacy is
different based on the context and the decision-maker. The mission of the
course series would be to better equip students with the knowledge and skills
needed to make them effective in today's courtrooms, regardless of who the
decisionmaker might be.

